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DIGNITY AND AUTONOMY AFTER
WASHINGTON V. GLUCKSBERG: AN ESSAY
ABOUT ABORTION, DEATH, AND CRIME
Lois Shepherdt
INTRODUCTION
It is time to rescue dignity and autonomy. Recent injudicious use,
overuse, interlacing and intertwining threaten to turn these concepts into
one meaningless slogan. Understandably, we are drawn to their timeless
and seductive appeal. Dignity is that exalted state of worthiness that
every person possesses. Dignity is next to Kant who is behind virtually
all modem bioethical queries (and attempts at answers). Autonomy-
"do your own thing"-is next to Mill, and more recently Dworkin, and is
the liberal community's somnambulistic mantra. Dignity and autonomy
are each so necessary in the liberal state that we feel we must have them
both in the same and equal doses. Unfortunately, we habitually link
them in such a manner that they appear to be one and the same concept.
The Supreme Court has recently characterized the decision to have
an abortion as one "central to personal dignity and autonomy."' Advo-
cates for physician-assisted suicide have argued that the right to end
one's life is no less "central to personal dignity and autonomy,"2 and
some courts have agreed.3 For example, the Ninth Circuit recently an-
nounced that prescriptions for lethal medication are central to dignity and
f Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University. B.A. 1984, University of North
Carolina; J.D. 1987, Yale Law School. Research for this article was supported by a grant from
Florida State University College of Law. My thanks go to Frank Garcia, Larry George, Larry
Palmer, Paul Shepherd, and Robin West for their helpful suggestions on earlier drafts, and to
Jolene Kinney, Karen Carlisle, and Susan Bloodworth for their superb research assistance.
1 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (O'Connor, Kennedy, & Sou-
ter, JJ.).
2 See, e.g., Respondent's Brief passim, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997) (No. 96-110) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief]; Brief for Ronald Dworkin et al., as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents passim, Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 [hereinafter the
Philosophers' Brief]; Brief Amici Curiae of Americans for Death with Dignity and the Death
with Dignity Education Center in Support of Respondents at 4-5, Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258;
Amicus Curiae Brief of Surviving Family Members.in Support of Physician-Assisted Dying at
6-7, Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258; Brief Amidi Curiae of Council for Secular Humanism and
International Academy of Humanism in Support of Respondents at 6-8, Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct.
2258; Brief Amicus Curiae of Julian M. Whitaker, M.D., in Support of Respondents at 9-10,
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258.
3 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 814, 839 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd
sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); Michigan v. Kevorkian, No. 93-
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autonomy,4 and advocates of physician-assisted suicide urged the
Supreme Court to uphold the Ninth Circuit's decision.5
In Washington v. Glucksberg,6 the Supreme Court ultimately re-
jected the dignity and autonomy argument, barely giving it passing men-
tion in a unanimous reversal of the Ninth Circuit.7 Relying instead on
history and tradition, the Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
was not offended by the State of Washington's ban against assisted sui-
cide.8 The Court's opening statement following the question of the case
portends the opinion's conclusion: "It has always been a crime to assist a
suicide in the State of Washington." 9 Glucksberg's analysis, suggested
by some precedent, continues closely along that line, asking whether a
right to assisted suicide is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition"'10 and "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' such that
'neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed."'' The
answer was a foregone conclusion considering the seven hundred year
common law tradition disapproving of assisted suicide. 12
According to the Court, the reliance of the respondents and the
lower court upon the rhetoric of certain earlier substantive due process
cases-namely Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health'3 and
11482, 1993 WL 603212, at *19 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1993), rev'd, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich.
1994).
4 See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 814, 839.
5 See supra note 2 & accompanying text.
6 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
7 Id. at 2269-70 (1997); see also Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2301 (1997) (holding
New York's prohibition on assisting suicide does not violate the Equal Protection Clause),
rev'g 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
8 See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2261.
9 Id. In Glucksberg, the Court discusses at length the long history of prohibitions
against assisted suicide. Id. at 2263-67. "[For over 700 years, the Anglo-American common-
law tradition has punished or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide." Id.
at 2263. "To hold for the respondents, we would have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine
and practice, and strike down the considered policy choice of almost every State." Id. at 2269.
1o Id. at 2268 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 484, 503 (1977) (plurality
opinion); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
11 Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). It is not clear under the
Court's analysis whether the asserted right must.be both deeply rooted in history and tradition
and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, or whether, as suggested by the language of
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986) (upholding Georgia's sodomy statute),
these might be two alternative analyses. See Michigan v. Kevorkian, No. 93-11482, WL
603212, at *8 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1993), rev'd, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994) (maintain-
ing that these descriptions provide two distinct but related routes to finding a fundamental
liberty right). The Court in Glucksberg, with its reliance upon the long history of legal
prohibitions against assisted suicide, appears to treat the tests as combined, or at least highly
interdependent.
12 See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2263.
13 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (upholding Missouri's requirement of clear and convincing evi-
dence of an incompetent patient's wishes concerning the withdrawal of life-sustaining treat-
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Planned Parenthood v. Casey'4-was misplaced. The Court noted that
in Cruzan, "the right assumed... was not simply deduced from abstract
concepts of personal autonomy."' 15 Referring to Casey, the Court added
"[t]hat many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping con-
clusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so
protected."' 16 With respect to the earlier privacy/liberty decisions that
Casey cited as protecting "choices central to personal dignity and auton-
omy," the Court characterized them as being less about grand ideas of
dignity and autonomy (ignore the fact that liberty must bear some resem-
blance to autonomy), and more about marrying and raising a family.17
As opposed to killing oneself, the decisions involved in marriage and
raising a family are historically sacrosanct.
Glucksberg, of course, will be interpreted in many ways. Some will
see it as reflecting a now dominant preference for states' rights and prin-
ciples of federalism. 18 Others will emphasize its display of judicial re-
ment). Cruzan is often mistakenly cited as establishing a right of competent individuals to
hasten their deaths by refusing artificially provided life-sustaining nutrition and hydration.
See, e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 816 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub
nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); Respondent's Brief at 23. During
oral arguments in Glucksberg, Justice Kennedy corrected the respondent's attorney's mis-
characterization of Cruzan as recognizing (rather than merely assuming for purposes of the
decision) a liberty interest of any kind, see In the Supreme Court of the United States, 12
IssuEs L. & MED. 393, 409-10 (1997) (Oral Arguments in Glucksberg), and the opinion of the
Court confirms that Cruzan involved the assumption of a liberty interest as it upheld the Mis-
souri law in question, rather than a recognition of a liberty interest. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct.
at 2270.
14 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
15 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2270.
16 Id. at 2271.
17 See id. at 2270 (explaining that the Court's opinion in Casey-relied upon heavily by
respondents and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for its apparent embrace of broad princi-
ples of individualism--drew on the Court's tradition of interpreting the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment "to protect certain fundamental rights and 'personal decisions re-
lating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and educa-
tion"') (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 581). Later, the Court explained away Casey's expansive
language, see infra note 25, as a way of describing, "in a general way and in light of our prior
cases, those personal activities and decisions" that the Fourteenth Amendment protects. Id. at
2271. In a corresponding footnote, the Court described those decisions cited in Casey as pri-
marily protecting marriage and the family. See id. at 2271 n.19. Bowers v. Hardwick similarly
dismissed such earlier cases as inapplicable: "No connection between family, marriage, or
procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated ......
478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986). Justice Blackmun's dissent in Bowers criticized the characteriza-
tion of the earlier cases as protective merely of the family, rather than as a more expansive
"'right to be let alone"' that includes the interests of individuals "in controlling the nature of
their intimate associations with others." Id. at 199, 204-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
18 See Ralph A. Rossum, Power to the States; The Supreme Court's Defense of Federal-
ism, SAN Dmso UNmoN-Tim., July 23, 1997, at B5 (inking the physician-assisted suicide
cases with others from the same term that "[struck] bold precedents for federalism"); Bruce
1998]
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straint' 9-evidence, perhaps, that the Court has learned from the
criticism it suffered for recognizing a constitutional right to abortion in
Roe v. Wade.20 The Court's reluctance to engage in a discussion of the
role of dignity and autonomy in constitutional jurisprudence and its re-
treat into history may indeed be partly explained by federalist leanings or
judicial restraint. But the suggestion that constitutionally protected rights
and liberties are restricted to those already recognized in our history and
tradition should concern us all. Even the cases that Glucksberg consid-
ers "concrete examples" 21 of fundamental rights already protected by the
Constitution-for example, the right to marry interracially and the right
to have an abortion 22-were hard-fought battles precisely because the
specific practices given constitutional protection by those cases had long
been outlawed.23
I believe that the Court was right in determining that the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment does not extend to physician-
assisted suicide. But the Court's quick and neglectful dismissal of the
appeals to dignity and autonomy, made for so long by so many advocates
of the right to die, is disappointing. Engaging in a discussion of dignity
Fein, Year of Justice Scalia, WASH. TIMES, July 1, 1997, at A15 (describing Washington v.
Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill along with other cases from term, such as Printz v. United
States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (holding portion of Brady Act unconstitutional), as revealing the
triumph of Scalia's "interpretive doctrine of original meaning"). Interestingly, Fein character-
izes Scalia's opinion in Printz as protecting the "dignity and autonomy" of the states "ac-
knowledged by the 10th Amendment." Fein, supra, at A15.
19 See They're No Philosopher-Kings, PROVIDENCE J.-BuLL., July 17, 1997, at B6
(describing Supreme Court's rulings in Glucksberg and Quill as "healthy example[s] of judi-
cial restraint"). The Court clearly placed some importance on the existence of an ongoing
public debate over physician-assisted suicide, characterizing its ruling as one of judicial re-
straint: "Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate
about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits
this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society." Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275;
see also Larry I. Palmer, Constitutional Analysis and Physicians' Rights After Vacco v. Quill,
7 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y (forthcoming 1998) (focusing on Quill as the more important
case for setting the stage for legislative debate and action in the issue of physician-assisted
suicide). "All of the Justices concluded [in Glucksberg and Quill] that the legislature is the
legal forum for defining which patient actions are self-killing or suicide . . . [and] which
physician acts constitute legally impermissible assistance in patient deaths." Id.
20 See John Carlson, Washington Had a Hand in 2 Rulings Reaffirming States' Rights,
NEw TRm., July 2, 1997, at A9 (ruling shows "reluctance to embrace the logic on which the
Roe v. Wade decision was made"); David G. Savage, High Court Refuses to Grant Constitu-
tional "Right to Die" Assisted Suicide, L.A. TIMEs, June 27, 1997, at Al (Court's approach
"stands in sharp contrast to its active intervention in the abortion controversy").
21 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2268.
22 Id. at 2267, 2271 n.19 (listing, among other cases, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (interracial marriage) and Casey); see also supra note 17.
23 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 (1967) (explaining that Virginia was one of
sixteen states prohibiting interracial marriages; penalties for miscegenation had been common
in the state since the colonial period; and the statutory scheme under question dated from the
adoption of the Racial Integrity Act of 1924); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 119 (1973) (stating
that Texas had enacted its first criminal abortion statute in 1854).
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and autonomy alongside a discussion of history and tradition would not
have required a decision in favor of the respondents in Glucksberg, and
could have continued a modem, developing discussion about the role of
ancient principles in shaping legal rights. Moreover, it could have
shaped and brought order to the dignity and autonomy discussion.
Dignity and autonomy are in quite a useless muddle. The disorder
that characterizes discussions of dignity and autonomy stems from two
failures-the failure to distinguish between the two terms and the failure
to define them. As dignity and autonomy, through careless and easy use
and overuse, have become less precisely defined and more inseparable
and interchangeable, the illuminating potential of the two concepts has
diminished. It is easy to appeal to dignity and autonomy-and the
Supreme Court has contributed to that ease-but it has not come without
cost.
Consider the Philosophers' Brief (as it has been named 4)-a
Glucksberg brief filed by six leading philosophers in support of a right to
physician-assisted suicide. The Philosophers' Brief is ultimately an un-
successful m6lange of abstract ideals and properly bluebooked legal pre-
cedent. Relying (as supporters invariably do) on the grandiloquent
language of the Court in Casey-about dignity, autonomy and determin-
ing the meaning of one's own existenceS-the Philosophers' Brief fails
to translate those terms according to the contexts in which they are used.
We might expect to find more attention to these fine and critical details
in such a brief. Failing to recognize that the terms "dignity" and "auton-
omy" carry different meanings in philosophical discourse, in legal dis-
course, and in the vernacular, the brief also fails to build the necessary
bridges between these understandings. In particular, the dignity that phi-
losophers speak of is not generally the dignity that the Supreme Court
relied upon in Casey or the dignity that Jack Kevorkian is said to pro-
mote in the back of his fatally equipped Volkswagen van.26 Perhaps
more significantly, dignity and autonomy often do not refer to the same
thing, and in this regard it is worth noting that we have been witnessing a
24 See Ronald Dworkin et al., Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers' Brief, N.Y. REv.
BooKs, Mar. 27, 1997, at 41.
25 The often quoted language of Casey is as follows:
These matters [decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family re-
lationships, child rearing and education], involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the
heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of
the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
505 U.S. at 851; see infra text accompanying notes 48-52.
26 See Brian Harmon, Kevorkian Van Might Fetch $50,000 as Museum Piece, DEr.
NEws, Mar. 6, 1997, at A13 (reporting that because Kevorkian "has helped several people die
in the back of his rusted Volkswagen van, the vehicle's curiosity value has soared.").
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death with dignity movement over the last decade and not a death with
dignity and autonomy movement.
The muddle is both understandable and lamentable. It is under-
standable because the Court has a history of using the terms dignity and
autonomy without defining them (especially dignity) or distinguishing
them. It is lamentable because the principles for which the words vari-
ously stand certainly have critical value for guiding our thinking with
respect to rights. We do not have to adopt the recent course chosen by
the Supreme Court and rigidly isolate categories of behavior that are
walled off for protection, leaving no portals for other activities to receive
similar refuge. At the same time, a liberal etherealization resulting from
rampant imprecision in the use of the terms dignity and autonomy almost
forces that result; the terms have become so unworkable that we should
not be surprised that the Supreme Court did not engage in a frontal as-
sault on the respondents' and others' reliance on these appealing
concepts.
It is time to attempt a rescue of dignity and autonomy by critically
examining the two concepts and their relationship to one another. We
must separate these conjoined siblings in order to save them. Separated,
they can mean something, and not only in airy philosophical quarters, but
also in the structure of legal rights.
Autonomy speaks volumes, and volumes have been justly spoken
about it. It is variously understood to mean consent,27 freedom of
choice,28 the ability to act independently of others, 29 and self-determina-
27 See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMEs F. CHILDRESS, PINCIPnS OF BIOMEDICAL ETHics
128 (4th ed. 1994) ("The basic paradigm of autonomy in health care, politics, and other con-
texts is express and informed consent.") (emphasis in original); RoBN WEST, NARRATVE,
AUTHoRrr, AND LAW 27-78 (1993) (taking Richard Posner to task for suggesting, in defense
of the wealth maximization precepts of law and economics, that autonomy might be equated
with consent: A person may consent to submit to authority, and "[s]ome such relationships
promote autonomy.... [m]any, however, do not," Id. at 46). Using Franz Kafka's stories of
individuals who willingly submit to authority, not to maximize their well-being (which is the
goal of Posner's rational actors in making choices), but "because of a felt compulsion to legiti-
mate the will of an authority," Id. at 75, West argues that focusing purely on momentary
consent improperly makes motives and effect irrelevant, and in the process neither autonomy
nor well-being are necessarily served.
28 Justice White's separate opinions in the abortion cases reveal an understanding of
autonomy as freedom of choice-where what matters is who makes the ultimate decision-
rather than a broader view of autonomy as self-determination-which requires more restraint
on the part of the state in attempting to influence a woman's decision. See infra note 47.
29 For an interesting discussion of autonomy as either independence or choice, see
Charles W. Lidz & Robert M. Arnold, Rethinking Autonomy in Long Term Care, 47 U. MIAMi
L. REv. 603, 608 (1993), who discuss the inadequacies of these views of autonomy in the
context of long-term care for the elderly. Because it still makes sense to speak about the
autonomy of elderly residents in long-term care facilities, even though they may be highly
dependent upon others for daily care, autonomy understood as independence, according to
these authors, misses the mark. They also criticize the understanding of autonomy as choice
because this view fails to address the reality of daily living at most long-term care facilities-
[Vol. 7:431
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tion.30 Feminists, critical legal scholars, and communitarians have as-
sailed the domination of autonomy in modem legal discourse; and the
liberal community has vigorously defended it.3 1 Autonomy, unlike dig-
nity, has not been neglected. In my argument to follow, I do not focus on
what autonomy means separately from dignity. Instead, I argue that each
of the various ways we define dignity (which has not received the critical
attention it deserves) renders the linking of the two terms problematic-
no matter which definition of autonomy we favor. Thus, by relying on
dignity and autonomy as an indistinguishable and inseparable pair, the
Supreme Court has provided an inadequate foundation for recognizing
the constitutional rights that appear, at times, to rest upon the two
concepts.
This article begins by discussing the abortion cases because it is in
that context that dignity and autonomy became prominently linked with
such an indelible flourish. Although right-to-die advocacy has relied ex-
there simply are not many choices for residents to make. To say that we are respecting the
autonomy of these elderly residents by letting them choose ignores the fact that there is so little
for them to decide.
30 When there is fundamental disagreement on the principles that should govern our be-
havior, such as in the context of abortion and physician-assisted suicide, we see appeals to
autonomy as self-governance at this high form: let people live according to their own morality.
This would appear to correspond to a Kantian notion of autonomy, which has been summed up
in the following way: "[A]utonomy is said to be a property of human wills; to have a will Kant
says, is to have "the power to act in accordance with [one's] idea of laws ... [or] princi-
ples...." THoMAs E. HiLL, JR., DiGNrrY AND PRACrICAL REAsON IN KANT's MoRAL THEORY
84 (1992). An individual in possession of autonomy has the power to discern the principles by
which she will live, and to make choices and to perform actions consonant with those princi-
ples. Words like "self-determination" and phrases like "creating one's own destiny" are most
often used to describe this conception of autonomy. It is in those areas of one's life where
decisions will profoundly affect not only the quality of one's life, but who one is, that we see a
willingness to recognize an individual's ability to make, not only her own choices, but her own
rules.
31 Recent work has tried to find middle ground between traditional liberal individualism
and its critics. See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connec-
tion, and Feminist Jurisprudence," 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1171, 1176 (1992) ("The feminist
argument that liberalism reflects an ethic of justice and rights but ignores an ethic of care and
responsibility that reflects women's experience overdraws the distinction between those two
ethics and overlooks the fact that both ethics can be found in liberalism."); Donald P. Judges,
Taking Care Seriously: Relational Feminism, Sexual Difference, and Abortion, 73 N.C. L.
REv. 1323 (1995) (arguing that relational feminism and radical feminism might find middle
ground with a conception of autonomy supplemented. by relation and care); Jennifer Nedelsky,
Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEM]niSM 7, 9
(1989) ("Feminists angrily reject the tradition of liberal theory that has felt so alien, so lacking
in language and ability to comprehend our reality, and that has been so successful in defining
what the relevant questions and appropriate answers are. Anyone who has listened closely to
academic feminists will have heard this undercurrent of rage at all things liberal. Yet liber-
alism has been the source of our language of freedom and self-determination.") (citations omit-
ted); Thomas E. Hill, Jr., The Importance of Autonomy, in WoMEN AND MoRAL THEORY 129
(Eva Feder Kittay & Diana T. Meyers eds., 1987) (arguing that our "autonomy-glorifying
tradition" is compatible with recognition of the moral importance of compassion.").
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tensively upon Casey, dignity and autonomy have been a linchpin of
abortion jurisprudence since Thornburgh v. American College of Obste-
tricians and Gynecologists.3 2 In Part I, I argue that while in rhetoric
dignity is given equal play with autonomy, practically it is useless, irrele-
vant, invisible. Dignity in the context of abortion precedent requires
nothing more than respecting the autonomous actions of rational persons.
That definition seems harmless enough (abortion rights could rest on au-
tonomy alone), until we consider that minors have abortion rights too,
and yet by definition, we do not respect their autonomous actions. Au-
tonomy and this empty form of dignity cannot, then, provide a full and
adequate basis for abortion rights. Relying as we have on the dignity/
autonomy concept, we have failed to pierce the rich obscurity that
grounds abortion rights.
In Part II, we move from the inadequacy of the dignity/autonomy
concept in the abortion cases to the more troublesome (and, we must
suppose, unintentional) misuse of the concept in physician-assisted sui-
cide advocacy. These advocates have misappropriated the central "dig-
nity and autonomy" language of abortion rights precedent. Dignity in the
context of the death with dignity movement is not simply about respect-
ing the autonomous actions of rational persons. Instead, it is about the
way one dies-in pain or in sleep, wasted or meaty, mumbling or howl-
ing, or humming. It is also about the way one lives in the dwindling
days, weeks, and years of life-useful or useless, admired or pitied,
sought or avoided, and again, mumbling or howling, or humming. Dig-
nity is emphatically not simply about making choices, and therefore, not
simply about autonomy. In fact, this kind of dignity has a very tenuous
relationship with autonomy and, pushed to the extreme, is the opposite of
autonomy. The doubleness of dignity-talk in right to die advocacy-
talking the "making choices" dignity, but meaning the "live and die
well" dignity-may well have sullied dignity to the extent that it will be
overlooked as a possible cornerstone for future constitutional rights.
This is a shame because the concept has done quite well in criminal de-
fense cases and should be able to serve us well in considering other
rights.
In Part III, I argue that a third way of understanding dignity-as the
intrinsic and unconditional worth of all human beings-has admirably
served our needs in providing a basis for the constitutional rights of crim-
inal defendants, such as the right to trial, and the rights against self-in-
crimination and cruel and unusual punishment. When we link this sort of
dignity with autonomy, in that ready and undiscriminating appeal to
"dignity and autonomy"-as in the cases concerning the right to self-
32 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1985).
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representation-we risk diluting its potential. Separately and critically,
however, it has much to offer. In conclusion, I speculate about what this
broader meaning of dignity (considered separately and distinctly from
autonomy) would add to the abortion and right to die contexts.
I. ABORTION: RIGHTS IN RICH OBSCURITY
A. DIGNITY AS AUTONOMY, OR A WARm, Fuzzy GLOW
A number of Supreme Court opinions refer to the decision to have
an abortion as "basic to individual dignity and autonomy. '33 While the
appeal to dignity and autonomy is perhaps at its height in the "soaring
language" 34 of the 1992 case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey35 (which
has uncharitably been described as "jurisprudence worthy of Murphy
Brown"), 36 the conjoining of the two concepts appeared as early as 1986
in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists.37 Thornburgh struck down a Pennsylvania law that required physi-
cians to provide certain information about the abortion procedure to their
patients, to report to the state information concerning patients seeking
abortions, to exercise care to preserve the life of the fetus, and to have a
second physician present during an abortion performed when the fetus
might be viable.38 Justice Blackmun, writing the opinion of the Court,
explained that the Constitution promises that government will not intrude
into an individual's private sphere of liberty, and "[flew decisions are
more personal and intimate, more properly private, or more basic to indi-
vidual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's decision ... whether to
end her pregnancy. ' '39
33 Thomburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
772 (1986); see Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 462 (1989) (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 548 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
34 Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide-Even a Very Limited Form, 72 U. DEr.
MERCY L. Rnv. 735, 768 (1995) (referring to "the right to define one's own existence" lan-
guage, quoted supra note 25). Justice Kennedy is given credit for contributing this language to
the opinion. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Agonizer, NEw YORKER, Nov. 11, 1996, at 88.
35 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
36 Terry Eastland, The Tempting of Justice Kennedy, AM. SPECTATOR, Feb. 1993, at 32,
37.
37 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
38 See id. at 758, 772.
39 Id. at 772.
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Although quoted frequently by the Supreme Court and lower courts
in majority40 and dissenting41 opinions, this dignity and autonomy lan-
guage has lacked much helpful elaboration, especially the concept of dig-
nity. In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,42 Justice Blackmun
added (in dissent) that the abortion decision is "uniquely personal, inti-
mate, and self-defining" 43 and "quintessentially intimate, personal, and
life-directing," 44 appropriately understood as within that "'certain private
sphere of individual liberty' that the Constitution reserves from the intru-
sive reach of government." 45 He continued that "[i]t is this general prin-
ciple, the 'moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not others nor
to society as a whole,' that is found in the Constitution. '46 The right to
have an abortion under this line of analysis is grounded in a respect for
an individual's capacity, desire, drive, and need for self-determination. 47
40 See Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Ada, 962 F.2d 1366, 1373 (9th
Cir. 1992) (striking down Guam's anti-abortion statute as unconstitutional); Roe v. Operation
Rescue, 123 F.R.D. 500, 505 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (granting class certification to plaintiffs seeking
to enjoin anti-abortion protestors from hindering the exercise of their rights to abortion).
41 See Webster, 492 U.S. at 548 (Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). In Webster, the Court held, inter alia, that Missouri's statutory
ban on the use of public employees and facilities for the performance or assistance of nonther-
apeutic abortions and its statutory prohibition on the use of public funds to encourage or coun-
sel women to have nontherapeutic abortions, were not unconstitutional. In addition, the Court
interpreted Missouri's statute requiring viability testing on fetuses believed to be twenty or
more weeks in gestational age in a way to avoid conflict with the Constitution. See also
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 462 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that a
Minnesota statute requiring two parent notification for a minor seeking an abortion and provid-
ing a judicial by-pass procedure to avoid the two parent notification was unconstitutional).
42 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
43 Id. at 548-49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 538.
45 Id. at 548.
46 Id. at 549 (quoting Justice Stevens' concurrence in Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 777 n.5
(quoting C. Fried, Correspondence, 6 Prim. & PUB. AuF. 288-89 (1977))). Stevens further
quoted Fried: "What a person is, what he wants, the determination of.his life plan, of his
concept of the good, are the most intimate expressions of self-determination, and by asserting a
person's responsibility for the results of this self-determination we give substance to the con-
cept of liberty." Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 777 n.5 (quoting C. FRIED, RiGHT AND WRONG, 146-
47 (1978)).
47 Contrast Justice Blackmun's analysis with the narrower approach of Justice White to
understanding autonomy as centering around choice, or perhaps even consent. In his dissent in
Thornburgh, White recognized that the right to abortion is grounded in a respect for individual
autonomy and privacy, 476 U.S. at 797 (White, J., dissenting), but he centered that autonomy
around freedom of choice. With this understanding, White found the majority's invalidation
of the information requirements of the Pennsylvania statute "extraordinary." Id. at 799.
"[A]fter all," he wrote, "Roe v. Wade purports to be about freedom of choice, and statutory
provisions requiring that a woman seeking an abortion be afforded information regarding her
decision not only do not limit her ability to choose abortion, but also would appear to enhance
her freedom of choice by helping to ensure that her decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy is an informed one." Id. (emphasis added). White is not concerned that the infor-
mation may persuade a woman to change her mind; indeed, "[i]f the information may reason-
ably affect the patient's choice, the patient should have that information." Id. at 801.
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It is all about autonomy. The mention of dignity in the same breath
merely softens autonomy's rank egocentricity and lends it a warm and
fuzzy glow.
Casey, as it reworked the language of Thornburgh with embellish-
ment, might be understood as giving dignity slightly more due. First,
Casey listed categories of personal decisions that the Constitution pro-
tects (as Washington v. Glucksberg would later do with a limiting ef-
fect).48  These are decisions "relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education." 49 But
instead of suggesting (as Glucksberg later does)50 that these are sealed
categories tagged for protection by tradition, Casey attempted to provide
a more convincing theoretical (and theatrical) basis for them:
As contrasted to Justice White's approach, autonomy under the legacy of Thornburgh
would mean more than choice. The majority in Thornburgh was concerned that the informa-
tion supplied to the pregnant woman would not inform the woman's consent, but "persuade
her to withhold it altogether." 476 U.S. at 762 (quoting Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc. v.
City of Akron, 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983)). The potentially coercive effect of certain informa-
tion would impair the woman's independence in creating her own future, defining her self.
Casey, of course, overruled Thornburgh regarding whether states may require physicians
to provide certain state-prescribed information to women seeking abortions. Casey, 505 U.S.
at 882. Casey held that states may require physicians to provide truthful, nonmisleading infor-
mation about the nature of the abortion procedure, the comparative health risks of abortion and
those of childbirth, and the probable gestational age of the fetus. Id. The Court, using its
undue burden analysis, permits states to enact legislation "aimed at ensuring a decision that is
mature and informed, even when in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth
over abortion." Id. at 883. A state measure designed to persuade a woman to choose child-
birth over abortion may pass constitutional muster as long as it does not present a substantial
obstacle to the woman's right to choose. See id. at 878.
Casey's approval of the information requirements imposed on physicians (and their pa-
tients) might appear to indicate a retreat from Thornburgh's expansive understanding of auton-
omy. One might surmise that the Court in Casey moved toward a narrower understanding of
autonomy, one more focused on consent than self-determination, closer to White's position in
Thornburgh. This may not be the case, however. Although the Supreme Court's decision in
Casey permitted information that might even persuade a woman to change her mind about
undergoing an abortion procedure, it did not necessarily adopt a narrower understanding of
autonomy. Rather, it adopted a broader deference to the state's interest in protecting fetal life.
See id. at 876. Indeed, it may have also adopted a more expansive definition of autonomy,
even if the ultimate protected liberty interest in abortion was scaled back. The language
quoted in the text, see infra text accompanying note 51, is most central to the opinion's posi-
tion and to the opinion's reception. It supports a broad notion of autonomy as freedom to
define one's self.
48 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; supra note 17 (quoting Glucksberg).
49 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1967);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)).
Casey cited several other cases to support the proposition that "the Constitution places limits
on a State's right to interfere with a person's most basic decisions about family and
parenthood." Id. at 849 (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
50 See supra note 17.
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These matters, involving the most intimate and per-
sonal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At
the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own exist-
ence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define
the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State.51
This passage suggests a definition for dignity: it is our capacity to
form beliefs about matters of marriage, procreation, contraception, fam-
ily relationships, child rearing, and education that "define[s] the attrib-
utes of personhood. '' 52 In the more traditional language of philosophers,
it is the capacity to make self-defining decisions that distinguishes
humans from other creatures and gives them dignity.53 Dignity, then, is
the moral status appropriate to beings with the capacity for self-determi-
nation. Dignity is conditioned on rationality.54
51 505 U.S. at 851 (emphasis added). As already noted in the text, the expansive lan-
guage of this passage has been received with some derision. In Justice Scalia's separate opin-
ion in Casey, he explained that he reached the conclusion that there is no constitutionally
protected abortion right "not because of anything so exalted as my views concerning the 'con-
cept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."' Id. at 980.
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Likewise, in his dissenting opinion in Compassion in Dying v. Washington, Circuit Judge
Beezer wrote: "Taken out of context, the 'right to define one's own concept of existence' is so
broad and melodramatic as to seem almost comical in its rhetorical flourish." 79 F.3d at 850.
But he continued that "the preceding sentence in Casey [referring to the "personal dignity and
autonomy" passage] provides a more somber and usable definition of liberty." Id.
Justice Scalia, however, pointedly disagrees with the usefulness of the dignity and auton-
omy language. Listing the phrases used by the plurality to describe the right to abort-such
as, "most intimate and personal choic[e]," "a person's most basic decisions," "originate[s]
within the zone of conscience and belief," and, of course, "central to personal dignity and
autonomy"-Scalia argued that these could just as easily describe "homosexual sodomy, po-
lygamy, adult incest, and suicide, all of which are equally 'intimate' and 'deep[ly] personal'
decisions involving 'personal autonomy and bodily integrity,' and all of which can be constitu-
tionally proscribed .. " 505 U.S. at 983-84 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
52 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
53 In Kantian theory, the distinctly human ability to reason about moral problems and
then to make moral decisions or take moral action is understood in terms of the "rational will."
IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 52-66 (Robert Paul Wolff
ed., 1969) [hereinafter "METAPHYsICs OF MORALS"]; see also JEPFPI 0. MURPHY & JULES L.
COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 82 (1990).
54 Kant himself does not appear to contemplate situations where an individual lacks ra-
tional powers. See, e.g., METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 53, at 52-66. But Robert
Goodin sums up Kant's position as follows: "Kant, tightening this ancient link between dig-
nity and 'autonomy,' holds that a man leads a dignified existence worthy of moral respect
because (and only insofar as) he is self-legislating, overcoming natural necessity and willing
his own actions." Robert E. Goodin, The Political Theories of Choice and Dignity, 18 AM.
PHIL. Q. 91, 95 (1981). Recognizing that Kant's intentions are not entirely clear, Goodin
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The overall effect of the language of the abortion cases is a strong
statement of autonomy understood as self-determination, and an under-
standing of dignity as the moral status appropriate to persons who have
the capacity for self-determination and who can thus form beliefs about
intimate and personal matters. We respect people because they can make
choices (they have dignity), and so we must respect the choices they
make (by permitting autonomous action). Dignity in the abortion deci-
sions is not considered separately from autonomy. Like autonomy, dig-
nity is about respecting life-directing decisions, nothing more or less.
B. THE IMMATURE MINOR: BEST INTERESTS RULE, NOT
DIGNTYr-AUTONOMY
That dignity adds nothing to autonomy in the abortion cases is made
even clearer by the conspicuous absence of references to "dignity and
autonomy" in the abortion cases dealing with minors.55 The abortion
right for immature minors (minors who lack the "experience, perspec-
tive, and judgment '56 to make important decisions) is not based on dig-
nity and autonomy; it cannot be, because immature minors, by definition,
lack the autonomous capacity to make the abortion decision.
To recognize the constitutional right of minors to have an abortion,
Bellotti v. Baird and similar cases rely on the general maxim that minors
possess constitutional rights like adults, and thus female minors possess a
right to abortion.57 Because of the unique status of minors, however,
states may impose greater restrictions on the exercise of a minor's abor-
tion rights.5 8 For example, states may require parental notification or
consent prior to a minor's undergoing an abortion as long as an adequate
writes that "it has now become commonplace to substitute 'capacity for choice' for 'dignity."'
Id. at 96. Goodin believes this conception of dignity is incomplete, because it focuses on
choices rather than on people. He cites another Kantian aphorism as more instructive, the fact
that a person can have "the idea of an 'I" and thus is "capable of possessing a self-image and
self-respect." Id. Thus, for Goodin it is the fact that a person can respect herself that provides
us with a reason to respect her in turn. See id. Dignity, then, "consists in self-respect." Id. at
99. A self-image and self-respect, however, still require a degree of rationality that many
individuals lack.
55 The plurality opinion in Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502,
520 (1990), did, in its conclusion, make confusing references to the "destiny and personal
dignity" of the woman and also to the "dignity" of the family. The Court in that decision
upheld the parental notification statute at issue. In dissent, Justice Blackmun accused the plu-
rality of "indulg[ing] in paternalistic comments" and hyperbole "to further incite [the] Ameri-
can press, public, and pulpit." Id. at 541 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
56 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979).
57 See id. at 633 ("A child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond the protec-
tion of the Constitution.").
58 The Court in Bellotti recognized that the status 9f minors is unique and that the consti-
tutional rights of children are distinguishable from those of adults. Id. at 633-35. "[A)Ithough
children generally are protected by the same constitutional guarantees against governmental
deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for chil-
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judicial procedure allowing the minor to bypass such notice or consent
requirements is available. 59 To be adequate, a judicial bypass procedure
must allow a minor to show either that she is well-informed and mature
enough independently to make the decision to abort (being, therefore, a
mature minor) or that, lacking such maturity (being an immature minor),
an abortion would be in her best interests. 60
It is plain to see that the judicial bypass procedure may respect the
autonomy and corresponding dignity of the mature minor, one who is
capable of making life-directing decisions-just like an adult. But on
what basis is the abortion right recognized as belonging to an immature
minor? Not on autonomy; a judge (if the judicial bypass procedure is
invoked), parent or guardian makes the ultimate decision whether the
minor may have the abortion, not the minor. Is dignity the basis for the
right? Not an understanding of dignity that requires us merely to respect
the autonomous decisions of others-the understanding of dignity em-
braced by the abortion decisions generally. In fact, the Court appeals to
neither autonomy nor dignity to define the immature minor's abortion
right. Instead, the Court relies on a sleight of hand by proclaiming that
minors have the same rights as adults (but maybe with some built-in
safeguards). 61
If immature minors lack dignity and autonomy in the sense that
Casey and other abortion cases use those terms, then what compels the
Supreme Court to recognize a minor's right to abortion? Bellotti and its
progeny do not lay a separate constitutional foundation for the abortion
right of immature minors. Therefore, we must look at the mechanism
chosen to allow exercise of the right. As noted above, the cases provide
a judicial bypass procedure through which the immature minor may es-
sentially obtain consent from the court to have an abortion, if the judge is
convinced that an abortion would be in the minor's best interests. It is
not clear how we get from the adult woman's dignity and autonomy to
the minor's best interests-or, perhaps what is going on is too clear.
What drives the Court here is not autonomy or dignity but raw need.
The immature minor cases illustrate that the abortion right, since we
are willing to recognize it for individuals who lack autonomy, need not
be grounded, or at least not grounded exclusively, in "dignity and auton-
dren's vulnerability and their needs for 'concern .... sympathy, and... paternal attention."'
Id. at 635 (quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971)).
59 See id. at 640-41; see also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
But see Lambert v. Wicklund, 117 S. Ct. 1169 (1997) (upholding state statute that required
court to authorize a minor's consent to abortion without parental notification when the imma-
ture minor showed that the notification (as opposed to the abortion itself) was not in her best
interests).
60 See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
61 See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633.
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omy" even for adult women. If the best interests of a minor are compel-
ling enough to support the minor's right to an abortion, why would they
not also be adequate to support an adult woman's right to an abortion?
Perhaps they are.
Casey, both in the plurality opinion and in Justice Blackmun's sepa-
rate opinion, expressed compassion for the suffering of women who face
unwanted pregnancies. The Court explained that "It]he mother who car-
ries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to
pain that only she must bear," and that "[h]er suffering is too intimate
and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of
the woman's role .... "62 Is it the "intimate and personal" nature of the
choice that governs here, as Casey's eloquent language would indicate,
or is it the "intimate and personal" nature of the suffering?63
Justice Blackmun was more explicit about the harms of unwanted
motherhood in his separate opinions in Casey and Roe v. Wade. In
Casey, he wrote:
By restricting the right to terminate pregnancies, the
State conscripts women's bodies into its service, forcing
women to continue their pregnancies, suffer the pains of
childbirth, and in most instances, provide years of mater-
nal care. The State does not compensate women for
their services; instead, it assumes that they owe this duty
as a matter of course. 64
Blackmun's majority opinion in Roe contains similar language:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the
pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether is ap-
parent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable
even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or
additional offspring, may force upon the woman a dis-
tressful life and future. Psychological harm may be im-
minent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by
child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned,
associated with the unwanted child, and there is the
62 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. We might compare this with similar language from Bellotti,
establishing the immature minor's right to an abortion if it is in her best interests: "Moreover,
the potentially severe detriment facing a pregnant woman is not mitigated by her minority.
Indeed, considering her probable education, employment skills, financial resources, and emo-
tional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally burdensome for a minor." Bel-
loti, 443 U.S. at 642 (citations omitted).
63 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 13, Gluck-
sberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (citing Casey for the proposition that "among other things, a prohibition
on abortion interferes with a woman's liberty interest in avoiding potential physical and mental
suffering associated with unwanted pregnancy and government-compelled childbirth").
64 Casey, 505 U.S. at 927 (Blackmun, J., concurringtin part and dissenting in part).
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problem of bringing a child into a family already unable,
psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other
cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and con-
tinuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. 65
Thus, the Court and individual Justices seem to have in mind the "best
interests" of the adult woman seeking an abortion as well.
C. THE INADEQUACY OF DIGNITY-AUTONOMY
From this discussion we can conclude that there are two problems
with relying on "dignity and autonomy" as the basis for recognizing
rights such as the abortion right when we understand dignity (along with
autonomy) to require nothing more than respecting choices. First, the
paired terms fail to reveal the basis of rights for those who are unable to
exercise autonomy because of a lack of maturity or competency. The
fact that the Constitution grants the same rights to competent adults is an
unconvincing justification for recognizing such rights for those who are
not competent or mature. As we have seen, the right of immature minors
to have an abortion appears to be based on the immature minor's best
interests, which is not a concept derived from autonomy or dignity when
dignity is treated just like autonomy. The Court, however, fails to lay the
critical theoretical groundwork for such rights based on need. The im-
plicit appeal to dignity and autonomy through the abortion decisions ap-
plicable to adult women disingenuously avoids difficult but necessary
questions about the basis of rights for nonautonomous persons.
Second, autonomy by itself (and autonomy is essentially by itself
because dignity has been collapsed into it) cannot fully explain various
rights we ascribe to competent individuals either. While respect for au-
tonomy may, perhaps, explain some of these rights, it is an inadequate
explanation for other rights that, like abortion, are accorded to both com-
petent and incompetent individuals alike. Whatever impels us to recog-
nize the right for the incompetent individual must also influence our
desire to recognize it for the competent individual. The immature mi-
nors' abortion right depends, it appears, upon our recognition of their
plight. We need to explore whether the adult's right is similarly
grounded (as suggested by Casey and Roe). Until we do, we will not
fully understand the basis of the abortion right. To paraphrase the
Court's opening admonition in Casey, we cannot escape this inquiry by
taking refuge in a jurisprudence of dignity and autonomy. 66
65 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
66 Casey, 505 U.S. at 843 (opening with: "Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of
doubt.").
DIGNrrY AND AuToNoMY
II. DEATH WITH DIGNITY: DIGNITY AS THE
RIGHT CHOICES, NOT THE RIGHT TO MAKE CHOICES
A. DiGNrrY WrrH SUBSTANTIVEa CONTENT
Advocates of physician-assisted suicide and their court sympathiz-
ers have benefitted from the prominent use of the phrase "dignity and
autonomy" in the abortion cases and the corresponding lack of any defi-
nitional content to the term "dignity." In 1994, Compassion in Dying, a
Washington-based non-profit organization, several doctors and their pa-
tients sought invalidation of Washington's ban against assisted suicide.67
They argued that a decision to hasten one's death with a lethal prescrip-
tion is no less central to dignity and autonomy than the decision to have
an abortion.68 A federal district court69 and then an en banc panel of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed,70 each calling Planned
Parenthood v. Casey "highly instructive" and "almost prescriptive" on
this point.71 The Ninth Circuit held that Washington's prohibition
against assisted suicide unduly burdened a terminally ill patient's right to
determine the time and manner of his death.72 The Supreme Court, of
course, held differently in Washington v. Glucksberg.
Because dignity is devoid of significant content in the abortion
cases, it is putty. Those who advocate recognition of a constitutional
right to physician-assisted suicide can and did appropriate the evocative
"dignity and autonomy" language of Casey. Assisted suicide advocates,
however, use a quite different and more powerful meaning of dignity. In
the abortion cases, dignity adds nothing substantive to the discussion of
rights.73 It is all (at least rhetorically) about autonomy. By contrast, in
67 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1456-58 (W.D. Wash.
1994), affd, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.
Ct. 2258 (1997).
68 Because Compassion in Dying assists individuals who commit suicide with self-ad-
ministered medications, the organization feared that it might be criminally prosecuted under
Washington's ban against any form of assisted suicide. The District Court did not address the
claims of Compassion in Dying because they were not discussed in the briefs before the court
on the parties' summary judgment motions. See id at 1467. The Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals accordingly determined that the claims involving Compassion in Dying were not before
it. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 797 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
69 See Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. 1454.
70 A panel of the Court of Appeals first reversed the District Court, but on rehearing the
case en banc, the Ninth Circuit reversed the panel's decision and affirmed the District Court.
See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d 790.
71 Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1459-60; Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 813-
14.
72 See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 816.
73 See generally supra Part L
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right-to-die advocacy, dignity means everything. It is all (again, at least
rhetorically) about dignity.74
This dignity, however, is not the dignity of philosophers. It is the
meaning of dignity that we find in everyday conversation: "the quality of
being worthy or honourable; worthiness, worth, nobleness, excellence. 75
When we say that someone acts in a dignified manner, we are saying
something about her behavior, not merely acknowledging the actor's
ability to reflect upon her course of action and to act according to her
choice (autonomy). Thus, we might consider an individual who meets an
unfortunate fate with her head held high as acting with great dignity; an
individual who babbles and cries is undignified.- We want our public
officials to act with dignity; we call some of them "dignitaries." Our
heroes act with dignity. It is not about winning; losers might lose with
dignity. It is about deportment. It is about how others perceive us.
The right-to-die movement has appealed to this content-based defi-
nition of dignity for a long time. Advocates insist that individuals have
the inherent right to die with dignity. The implicit idea is that health care
providers too often treat dying patients with aggressive measures that do
nothing more than prolong the dying process. By prolonging the dying
process, doctors extend the period of time over which the patient suffers
from a loss of dignity, suffers from impaired reason or memory, loses
control over bodily functions, and becomes increasingly dependent upon
others for the most basic needs.76 Doctors might make the patient's loss
of dignity greater by administering heavily sedating medications to ease
pain. Pain, it seems, pales in comparison to the burden of indignity. It is
not specifically and predominantly pain that we are supposed to want to
avoid in our final days, although pain is not discounted, but we are to
avoid being helpless, incontinent, incoherent, dependent, drooling, a bur-
den to others, and of poor general deportment.77 The concept of dignity
in the right-to-die movement is laden with strong normative content. It is
74 See generally Lois Shepherd, Sophie's Choices: Medical and Legal Responses to Suf-
fering, 72 No=R DAME L. REv. 103 (1996) (discussing the role of suffering in present-day
responses to requests for legalized assisted suicide).
75 OxFoRD ENGLISH DicnoNARY 656 (2d ed. 1989).
76 See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 812 ("The now recognized right to refuse or
terminate treatment and the emergent right to receive medical assistance in hastening one's
death are inevitable consequences of changes in the causes of death, advances in medical
science, and the development of new technologies. Both the need and the capacity to assist
individuals to end their lives in peace and dignity have increased exponentially.") (citations
omitted). But see Ezekiel Emanuel, Whose Right to Die? ATLAIrc MONmLY, Mar. 1997, at
73, 75 (referring to the statement quoted above as a "myth").
77 See Philosophers' Brief, supra note 2, at 7 (explaining that the patient-plaintiffs in
Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill: "want to end their lives when they think that
living on, in the only way they can, would disfigure rather than enhance the lives they had
created. Some people make the latter choice not just to escape pain. Even if it were possible
to eliminate all pain for a dying patient-and frequently that is not possible-that would not
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powerfully attractive. To the extent that dignity embodies a notion of
what is worthy, noble, and honorable, almost no one would choose a life,
or death, describable by terms meaning the opposite of dignity.
The death with dignity refrain embodies two notions: one, that an
individual must have the option to have a dignified method of death, and
two, that an individual must not be forced to continue living without
dignity. Both of these concerns influenced the Ninth Circuit's decision
to invalidate Washington's ban on physician-assisted suicide.78 With re-
spect to the first concern, the method of death, the Court discussed evi-
dence offered at trial of people who wished to "die with dignity" having
to resort to "gruesome alternatives" 79 because physician assistance was
unavailable. One man, "deprived of the chance to die in a dignified man-
ner with his loved ones by his side,"' 80 shot himself to death, leaving his
relatives to clean his "splattered brains off the basement walls." 81 An-
other patient wished for "the dignity of dying in her own bed, surrounded
by the things she loved."8 2 Dying in a protracted, drug-induced stupor
from medication prescribed to ease intolerable pain, or dying by self-
induced suffocation, or jumping off of a bridge are examples of the un-
dignified deaths chosen by desperate patients "deprived of physician
assistance."83
Regarding the second notion of dignity in the "death with dignity"
context, that of dignity in living, the Ninth Circuit focused on the lack of
dignity experienced by many individuals who are terminally ill. The
Court explicitly recognized that the failing quality of life of the individ-
ual takes away his dignity:
A competent terminally ill adult, having lived nearly the
full measure of his life, has a strong liberty interest in
choosing a dignified and humane death rather than being
reduced at the end of his existence to a childlike state of
helplessness, diapered, sedated, incontinent. How a per-
son dies not only determines the nature of the final pe-
riod of his existence, but in many cases, the enduring
memories held by those who love him.84
To illustrate the point, the Court related the testimony of one woman
who explained how her father, "to whom dignity was very important, lay
end or even much alleviate the anguish some would feel at remaining alive, but intubated,
helpless, and often sedated near oblivion.").
78 See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 834-35.
79 Id at 834.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 835.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 834.
84 Id. at 814.
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dying diapered, moaning in pain, begging to die."'85 The Court stated
that for such people, "the decision to commit suicide is not senseless, and
death does not come too early."'86
A Michigan state court, in another decision that was ultimately re-
versed, went even further in its willingness to recognize content-based
meaning in the term "dignity" and even in the term "autonomy." The
Michigan court in Michigan v. Kevorkian held that criminalizing physi-
cian-assisted suicide was unconstitutional because it violated a person's
right to commit "rational" suicide.87 The opinion noted that "many, if
not most" physicians (like the defendant) "accept the fact that under spe-
cifically defined conditions the alternative to life serves the best interest
of the patient, the surviving family, and society," and that these physi-
cians accept this fact based on "contemporary attitudes about personal
dignity and autonomy, the quality of life, happiness, and the meaning of
life."'88 Let's overlook the others referred to in the court's statement-
"the surviving family, and society"-because it is certainly far from
clear how their best interests should come into play in defining the lib-
erty interests of the individual. That concern aside, the court's statement
in Kevorkian indicates that physicians accept that the best interests of the
patient may be the "alternative to life" (i.e., death), because the patient
no longer enjoys dignity and autonomy in life. In this context, the terms
dignity and autonomy do not refer to the freedom to make choices (e.g.
whether to live or to hasten death). Rather, the terms refer to contempo-
rary attitudes of how one should live an independent life.89
85 Id. at 835.
86 Id. at 821.
87 Michigan v. Kevorkian, No. 93-11482, WL 603212, at *18 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13,
1993), rev'd, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994). The Court found "that when a person's quality of
life is significantly impaired by a medical condition and the medical condition is extremely
unlikely to improve, and that person's decision to commit suicide is a reasonable response to
the condition causing the quality of life to be significantly impaired, and the decision to end
one's life is freely made without undue influence, such a person has a constitutionally pro-
tected right to commit suicide." Id. at *19.
88 Id. (emphasis added).
89 This statement of the Michigan state court may indeed be true, insofar as it tells us
what physicians accept. Timothy Quill (one of the plaintiff-physicians in Quill v. Vacco), in
his famous letter to the New England Journal of Medicine in 1991, describes the case of Diane,
a patient of his for whom he prescribed a lethal dose of barbiturates. Timothy E. Quill, Death
and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision Making, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 691, 691-94
(1991). It is clear from his letter that he is very much attuned to her felt need to remain
independent of others (autonomous) in life, and not to succumb to a life of dependency in the
final stages of terminal leukemia. In prescribing the barbiturates, one may well ask whether
Quill was respecting her freedom to make this choice, or whether he was instead promoting an
understanding of Diane, both to herself and others, as independent. Quill describes his initial
response to her request: "Knowing of her desire for independence and her decision to stay in
control, I thought this request made perfect sense." Id. at 693. See generally Patricia Wesley,
Dying Safely, 8 Issues in L. & Med. 467 (1993) (critiquing Quill's text and arguing that ac-
cording to his own account Quill was a "powerful actor" in Diane's story, injecting his own
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Using this line of reasoning, it is possible, indeed appropriate, to
judge decisions about whether to choose life or death based upon
whether those decisions promote normatively based notions of autonomy
as well as dignity. Identifying "choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy," then, does not mean that we leave those choices to the indi-
vidual because we respect her ability and the importance to her self-de-
termination to make them. Instead, we protect choices that, properly
made, promote dignity (proper conduct and appearance) and autonomy
(independent living). If this is the theoretical underpinning to finding a
liberty interest in committing rational suicide, then that liberty interest
would be in having certain avenues open (i.e., rational, physician-as-
sisted suicide) rather than in having all avenues open (i.e., life without
dignity). This is about outcomes, not process. The choices made by an
individual would be subject to our scrutiny and approval or disapproval
as conforming to an expectation about dignified behavior.
Autonomy is not typically so mangled in right-to-die advocacy,
although this is standard fare for dignity. The confusion is not limited to
lower courts and liberal circuits. Conflicting views of the term dignity
are also apparent (and similarly unacknowledged) in Cruzan v. Missouri
Department of Health,90 the other Supreme Court case (besides Casey)
that the Ninth Circuit relied upon to determine that there was a constitu-
tionally protected right to die.91 Cruzan, the Supreme Court later in-
sisted in Glucksberg, was about unwanted medical treatment and the
common law of battery, not about a right to die; and the right to with-
draw unwanted medical treatment that was assumed (not announced) by
the Court in Cruzan "was not simply deduced from abstract concepts of
personal autonomy" (or dignity, the Court might have added). 92 The
Supreme Court Justices, however, were interested in dignity and auton-
omy in Cruzan, even though they did not then, and still have not, shown
an awareness of the different ways in which the term dignity is used.
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor insisted that a competent indi-
vidual has a right to refuse unwanted artificial feeding and hydration just
as she might refuse other forms of forced medical treatment.93 "Requir-
ing a competent adult to endure such procedures against her will,"
values into her medical decisions). Justice Stevens, in his concurrence in Glucksberg and
Quill cites Dr. Quill's letter for the proposition that in some circumstances assisting in a pa-
tient's suicide would not harm the physician-patient relationship. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at
2309.
90 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (holding that the Constitution permits a state to require clear and
convincing evidence of an incompetent individual's wishes with respect to withholding nutri-
tion and hydration).
91 See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 814-16.
92 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2270.
93 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
19981
452 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAw AND PuBLIc POLICY
O'Connor wrote, "burdens the patient's liberty, dignity, and freedom to
determine the course of her own treatment."94 By linking dignity with
freedom in decision-making and presupposing that it requires compe-
tency, O'Connor uses the understanding of dignity that we find in the
abortion cases, dignity as autonomy.
A few pages later, Justice Brennan's dissent used the more restric-
tive, content-laden definition of dignity. Brennan argued that Nancy
Cruzan deserved to "die with dignity. '95 (Of course, what Brennan re-
ally meant was that Nancy Cruzan should not have to live without dig-
nity; she was not terminally ill, but in a persistent vegetative state that
could have continued for years.) While on the one hand Brennan recog-
nized that decisions about life-prolonging medical procedures are per-
sonal,96 he was clearly not referring to dignity merely in the sense of
respecting choices. He noted that "[flor many, the thought of an ignoble
end, steeped in decay, is abhorrent. A quiet, proud death, bodily integ-
rity intact, is a matter of extreme consequence. '97
It is no wonder, then, with this kind of imprecision, that advocates
for a "proud death" have been able to tap into the rich language of abor-
tion decisions referring to choices central to personal dignity and auton-
omy, even though choice-making in and of itself is not the act that
defines dignity for such advocates in the right-to-die context.98 Rather, it
is the actual choice made and the effect that choice will have on the
individual that is central to dignity in the death with dignity movement.
The assisted suicide advocates do not ignore the ability to choose-be-
cause choosing is still central to autonomy, and both dignity and auton-
omy are appealed to-but dignity and autonomy are not embracing the
same value, and may in fact be at odds with one another.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96 See id. at 311.
97 Id. at 310-11. To illustrate his point, Brennan quoted from Brophy v. New England
Sinai Hospital Inc., 497 N.E. 2d 626, 635 (Mass. 1986), where the court found that the patient
was "in a condition which [he] indicated he would consider to be degrading and without
human dignity" and also that "[t]he duty of the State to preserve life must encompass a recog-
nition of an individual's right to avoid circumstances in which the individual himself would
feel that efforts to sustain life demean or degrade his humanity." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 310
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
98 The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Compassion in Dying v. Washington adroitly switches
between an autonomy-based notion of dignity and a normatively based notion of dignity. Its
statement quoted above (see supra text accompanying note 84), about a person's liberty inter-
est in choosing a "dignified and human death rather than being reduced at the end of his
existence to a childlike state of helplessness, diapered, sedated, incontinent," 79 F.3d at 814,
follows immediately in the opinion on the heels of another reference to the Casey quote about
"a choice central to personal dignity and autonomy." Id.
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B. AUTONOMY AND DIGNITY IN CoNFLIcr
If dignity refers to the way one lives as a sick or dying patient-the
extent to which one retains dignity during the trials of illness and de-
cline-and also to the way one dies-i.e., quietly, peacefully, as a com-
petent individual rather than sedated and incompetent or violently
through a "makeshift" suicide-then dignity does not refer simply to au-
tonomy. Instead, dignity refers to a specific valuation of the quality of
one human being's existence and his dying process. Thus, respecting
someone's dignity in the "death with dignity" context presupposes mak-
ing a value judgment about an individual's quality of life, while respect-
ing that same person's autonomy would require us to avoid making such
value judgments.
The well-known case of Elizabeth Bouvia99 illustrates the conflict
between respecting an individual's dignity and respecting her autonomy.
Bouvia, a woman who was not terminally ill but who suffered from cere-
bral palsy, quadriplegia, and arthritis, brought suit in the early 1980s to
have the nasogastric tube that provided her'with nutrition and hydration
removed.'00 She had been placed in a hospital not because she required
the sophisticated medical care that only a hospital could provide, but
because she lacked a home and a caregiver.' 0 1 The court held that
Bouvia had a right to have the tube withdrawn just as she could refuse
any medical treatment.10 2 The decision, therefore, appears grounded in
recognition of Bouvia's autonomy. But the California court went to
great lengths to confirm that Bouvia was making a rational decision in
choosing to end her life. According to the court, Bouvia's life "ha[d]
been diminished to the point of hopelessness, uselessness, unenjoyability
and frustration,"'1 3 and she was "imprisoned and [had to] lie physically
helpless, subject to the ignominy, embarrassment, humiliation and dehu-
99 Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
100 See id. at 298.
101 See Paul K. Longmore, Elizabeth Bouvia, Assisted Suicide and Social Prejudice, 3
IssuEs L. & MED. 141, 152-57 (describing Bouvia's life-long encounters with prejudice and
the personal emotional upheavals that preceded her petition for removal of her feeding tube,
which included a miscarriage and separation from her husband).
102 Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300-04. The court writes:
Here Elizabeth Bouvia's decision to forego medical treatment or life support through
a mechanical means belongs to her. It is not a medical decision for her physicians to
make. Neither is it a legal question whose soundness is to be resolved by lawyers or
judges. It is not a conditional right subject to approval by ethics committees or
courts of law. It is a moral and philosophical decision that, being a competent adult,
is hers alone.
Id. at 305. Bouvia later decided not to have her feeding tube removed even though she had
won the court's approval to do so. According to newspaper accounts, she "changed her plans
almost immediately, when she realized that it would take several painful weeks for her to die."
10 Years After Winning Right to Die, Patient Lives, ORL.ANo Smr],mL, Dec. 17, 1993, at A5.
103 Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
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manizing aspects created by her helplessness."' 10 4 The court stated that it
could not fault her for considering her existence meaningless. 10 5
Was it Bouvia's autonomy or dignity that required the removal of
her feeding tube? If respect for Bouvia's autonomy drove the court's
opinion, then why did it discuss her undignified state? Respecting her
autonomy would require letting Bouvia make her own judgments about
"the meaning of existence" without the court agreeing that her existence
might be meaningless.
The court respected Bouvia's autonomy only because it agreed with
her assessment of her dignity. If the court believed that Bouvia's condi-
tion was not undignified, then respecting her autonomy (which might
require us to remove the feeding tube, at her request) would not require
the same action as respecting her dignity (which might require instead
that the court convey the message that her life is worth living and, per-
haps, that our society must better provide for people in her condition).
On the other hand, if the court considered Bouvia's condition undignified
but she did not wish to end her life, then respect for her dignity (which
might cause us to persuade her, in countless subtle and indirect ways to
end her life) would not require the same response as respect for her au-
tonomy (which would appear to prohibit any such suggestions).
The potential conflict between the two concepts is highlighted fur-
ther if we consider that insistence on either value would be at the ex-
pense of the other. First, consider what insisting on autonomy does to
dignity. It is easy to see that a person may have autonomy and yet lack
dignity in the normative sense. Certainly, one can have the capacity for
autonomous action and exercise autonomy in ways that are undignified.
To take an example outside of the emotionally charged context surround-
ing the end of life, a person might knowingly and deliberately choose to
grovel, yet groveling is considered unseemly or undignified. Thus, just
because a person has both the capacity for autonomy and the liberty to
exercise it does not mean that she will choose to act with dignity. Insist-
ing on autonomy, then, may lead to undignified conduct.
Second, and more troubling, insisting on dignity, whether in the
context of mundane issues such as table manners or extremely important
issues at the end of life, impinges on autonomy because it restricts the
choice to be undignified. For individuals considered to lack dignity in
life, insisting upon dignity may, in the extreme, eliminate the choice of
life. This is what appears to have happened to Brianne Rideout, a termi-
nally ill three-year-old child who lapsed into a coma after she had been
104 Id. at 305.
105 See id. at 304.
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placed on a ventilator. 0 6 It makes little or no sense to speak of her
autonomy, but the parents of ill children are usually considered to pos-
sess the authority to make medical decisions on their children's behalf.
Over the parents' protests, Brianne's physicians removed her from the
ventilator, and she died. To justify this unilateral action, the chief oper-
ating officer of the hospital described the physicians' actions as an effort
"to continue to preserve the dignity of the child."'10 7
One might argue that the physicians' withdrawal of treatment for
Brianne Rideout over the protest of her parents, which many (rightly)
have found outrageous, is not illustrative of the conflict between auton-
omy and dignity because it makes no sense to speak of Brianne's auton-
omy. Furthermore, the argument continues, if a patient were competent,
insistence on dignity would not require the withdrawal of treatment be-
cause competency itself reveals a dignity in life that we would respect.
But it is certainly not clear that this is so. People who are willing to
make normative judgments about the dignity of dying persons would be
apt to say that someone completely lacking in autonomous powers lacks
dignity. They do not, however, insist on a lack of autonomous powers
before deciding that a life is undignified. Indeed, almost the opposite is
the case: both the Oregon legislation permitting physician-assisted sui-
cide'0 8 and the appellate decisions recognizing a constitutional right to
physician-assisted suicide'0 9 insist that a person be competent before she
avails herself of physician assistance to end or avoid an undignified life.
Without such provisions respecting autonomy, insisting on dignity would
require withdrawing treatment without consent.
Of course it is true that we do not have to insist upon either dignity
or autonomy to the exclusion of the other. But considering both concepts
would require balancing the two, and balancing two distinct and dispa-
rate values is certainly different than thinking about the relationship be-
tween dignity and autonomy as harmoniously linked. Balancing does not
imply that both values are fully expressed; quite the opposite, it suggests
that one or both must be compromised. Until we recognize that dignity
conditioned on behavior (or health, appearance, status, condition, mobil-
ity, continence) and autonomy are at odds with each other, we will not
begin to discover what trade-offs between the two may be appropriate.
The easy and uncritical use of the phrase "dignity and autonomy" in
the context of right to die advocacy avoids our necessary discovery of the
106 See Frank Bruni, A Fight Over Baby's Dignity and Death, N.Y. TIES, Mar. 9, 1996,
at 6.
107 Id.
108 See OR. REv. STAT. § 127.800-897 (Supp. 1996) (The Oregon Death with Dignity
Act).
109 See, e.g., Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d 790.
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appropriate relationship between the two concepts. It has also made it
difficult to discuss what we mean, or what we want to mean, when we
talk about dignity in a sense that is constitutionally relevant. Cases that
establish the rights of criminal defendants talk about an entirely different
kind of dignity. In one set of cases, those concerning the right to self-
representation, dignity and autonomy are linked as the foundation for the
constitutional rights therein recognized. While linking dignity and au-
tonomy in those cases dilutes the potential good of such a broad under-
standing of dignity, the cases nevertheless provide another line of
precedent, though imperfect, to which we might turn to understand the
relationship between dignity and rights.
III. UNCONDITIONAL DIGNITY
A. A DIGNITY FOR ALL
The broadest understanding of dignity equates it with the intrinsic
worth of all human beings. In speaking about human dignity, philoso-
phers recognize that the ability to reason about moral problems and then
to make moral decisions or take moral action sets humans apart from
other animals. In Kantian theory, this distinctly human ability is under-
stood in terms of the "rational will." 110 Because humans are creatures
with the capacity for a rational will, they have the moral status of "dig-
nity." '' Kant's moral theory is grounded in the idea that the dignity of
human beings as rational creatures must be respected and protected; indi-
viduals must be treated as persons, not objects, as ends in themselves and
not as means to other ends.' 12
This unconditional understanding of human dignity requires only
humanness. Even a person who acts immorally is due respect as a
human being. 1 3 We may not like her or find her useful, desire her com-
pany, or think her moral, but the individual possesses dignity, 114 now and
forever. Dignity cannot be lost, given up, or taken away. We may talk
about offenses against the dignity of a person, or "indignities" that a per-
110 According to R.S. Downie and Elizabeth Telfer, "to have a rational will is to be capa-
ble not simply of thinking rationally but also of acting rationally." R. S. DOWNIE & ELIZA-
BETH TELFER, RESPECT FOR PERSONS 20 (1970). This involves (1) "the ability to choose for
oneself, and, more extensively, to formulate purposes, plans and policies of one's own," (2)
"the ability to carry out decisions, plans or policies without undue reliance on the help of
others" (these two abilities constitute self-determination), and (3) "the ability to govern one's
conduct by rules" and "to adopt rules which one holds to be binding on oneself and all rational
beings." Id. at 20-21.
111 METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 53, at 60-61; MUmHY & COLEMAN, supra note
53, at 82.
112 See METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 53, at 52; MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note
53, at 83.
113 See HILL, supra note 30, at 179.
114 See id. at 202.
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son may suffer, but such offenses or indignities do not cause a person to
lose dignity; rather, they show an improper lack of respect on the part of
the offender for the dignity of another human being.
While dignity refers to an intrinsic quality that is not lost or compro-
mised by bad acts or gained by good acts, it is not clear whether, in the
Kantian tradition, an individual must be minimally rational in order to
have dignity.1 5 Our jurisprudence reflects this same ambiguity. The
abortion rights cases, as we have seen, assume an understanding of dig-
nity that requires an individual to be able to make choices, to act autono-
mously. But the dignity that defines the rights of criminal suspects,
defendants and prisoners is not dependent on any degree of rationality." 16
It embraces all people.
B. THE DiGN rr oF CRIMINALS
The Supreme Court has identified the "dignity of man" as the basic
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against in-
flicting cruel and unusual punishment. 1 7 Justice Brennan's concurrence
in Furman v. Georgia18 explicitly linked the dignity protected by the
115 See MawrAPlrYsics op MORALS, supra note 53, at 52-66; Goodin, supra note 54, at 95.
116 This broad sense of human dignity is also apparent in cases concerning discrimination
based on race, gender, or other suspect characteristics. The dignity that all human beings share
requires that they be accorded equal respect. Denying equal access to public establishments
results in the "deprivation of personal dignity." Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (permanently enjoining motel from refusing to provide rooms to
people on the basis of race). In his concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg quoted the Senate
Commerce Committee: "Discrimination is not simply dollars and cents, hamburgers and mov-
ies; it is the humiliation, frustration, and embarrassment that a person must surely feel when he
is told that he is unacceptable as a member of the public because of his race or color." Id. at
292. Racial discrimination in the qualification or selection of jurors likewise "offends the
dignity of persons and the integrity of the courts." Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc.,
500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991) (explaining also that "classifications based on ancestry or skin color"
are not consistent with "respect for the dignity of persons," l at 631). In the workplace,
individuals discriminated against are deprived not only of their property rights, but also of
their right to respect for their dignity. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992)
(Souter, J., concurring) (stating that Title VII "vindicates an interest in dignity as a human
being entitled to be judged on individual merit"); Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, 66 FEP Cases
(BNA) 581, 582 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1994) (stating that "[s]exual harassment strips the victim of
dignity and self-respect. Such harassment is degrading and dehumanizing."); see generally
Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a Coherent Na-
tional Discharge Policy, 57 Omo ST. L.J. 1443 (1996) (discussing the difference between the
property rights and dignity rights implicated in employment discrimination cases).
117 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (the requirement that a penalty must
accord with the "dignity of man" "means, at least, that the punishment not be 'excessive,"'
meaning it must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or be grossly dis-
proportionate to the severity of the crime). The Supreme Court in Gregg held that the death
penalty is not a form of punishment that may never be imposed. Id. at 187.
118 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that the death penalty
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).
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Eighth Amendment to the intrinsic (unconditional) worth of human
beings:
The State, even as it punishes, must treat its members
with respect for their intrinsic worth as human beings. A
punishment is 'cruel and unusual' therefore, if it does
not comport with human dignity .... The primary prin-
ciple is that a punishment must not be so severe as to be
degrading to the dignity of human beings. 119
Cruel and unusual punishments disregard the fundamental premise
of the Eighth Amendment-that "even the vilest criminal remains a
human being possessed of common human dignity."' 20 In Furman, Jus-
tice Brennan noted that it is "[m]ore than the presence of pain" that
makes severe punishment "degrading to the dignity of human beings.' 21
It is the fact that these punishments "treat members of the human race as
nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded."122 For this rea-
son, expatriation, which is not physically painful, may be a form of cruel
and unusual punishment 123 because "it necessarily involves a denial by
society of the individual's existence as a member of the human commu-
nity."'124 The infliction of severe pain, execution, and expatriation may
each fail to respect the human dignity that every person, even a despised
criminal, possesses because they treat the criminal as an object rather
than as a person.
The Court has also used dignity to ground the Fifth Amendment's
guarantee against self-incrimination. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court
noted that "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege [against
self-incrimination] is the respect a government-state or federal-must
119 Id. at 270-7 1; see also id. at 296 (describing our society as one "for which the dignity
of the individual is the supreme value").
120 Id. at 273.
121 Id. at 272.
122 Id.
123 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
124 Furman, 408 U.S. at 273-74. In describing the pain of expatriation, Brennan quotes
from Trop v. Dulles:
There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive torture. There is in-
stead the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society. It is a form
of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the polit-
ical existence that was centuries in development. The punishment strips the citizen
of his status in the national and international political community. His very exist-
ence is at the sufferance of the country in which he happens to find himself.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 274 n.15 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 101-102); see also Wood-
son v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens,
JJ.) (Death penalty process that failed to assess propriety in each individual case "treats all
persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but as
members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the
penalty of death.").
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accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens."' 25 The state must
produce evidence against an accused individual by its own independent
labors and not resort to the "cruel, simple expedient of compelling it
from [the accused's] own mouth."'1 2 6 Guilt or innocence is of less conse-
quence than our respect; the concern is that such a "cruel, simple expedi-
ent" will violate dignity to such an extent that a guilty verdict will reflect
worse on us than it does on the accused. 127
Intrusive searches of the body, such as body cavity searches of in-
mates after visitation, 28 or the withdrawal of blood samples for intoxica-
tion tests, 129 or urinalysis collection to test for illegal drugs, 130 also risk
violating an individual's dignity. While the Court has generally upheld
such practices, it has nevertheless recognized that the Fourth Amendment
protects "Itihe interests in human dignity and privacy ... [which] forbid
any ... intrusions [beyond the body's surface] on the mere chance ihat
desired evidence might be obtained."' 131 The dissenting voices in these
types of cases express more vocally the offense to dignity implicatedby
such practices. In Bell v. Wolfish, upholding various prison search prac-
tices, including body cavity searches conducted after visitation, Justice
Marshall argued in dissent that "body-cavity searches of.. .inmates
represent one of the most grievous offenses against personal dignity and
common decency."'132 The practice "placed inmates in the most degrad-
ing position possible."' 33 The process was even more "humiliating" be-
cause correctional officers often conducted the searches while other
inmates were present.' 34 Justice Stevens, also in dissent, found the body
search practice, as well as other prison rules at issue, as "either unneces-
125 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
126 Id.
127 See id. at 447 (quoting the Wickersham Commission Report: "To the contention that
the third degree is necessary to get the facts, the reporters aptly reply in the language of the
present Lord Chancellor of England (Lord Sankey): 'It is not admissible to do a great right by
doing a little wrong .... It is not sufficient to do justice by obtaining a proper result by
irregular or improper means."').
128 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (holding body cavity searches conducted
after visitation not unconstitutional).
129 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (upholding blood sample test for
intoxication).
130 See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (holding
U.S. Customs Service's drug screening program for employees was a reasonable search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602 (1989) (holding urinalysis and blood testing to detect drugs or alcohol in railroad
employees was reasonable and therefore constitutional).
131 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70. Despite the Fourth Amendment's protection against
unreasonable searches, in Schmerber, "the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the cir-
cumstances, threatened the 'destruction of evidence,"' and so the search was held to be reason-
able. Id. at 770.
132 441 U.S. at 576-77 (Marshall, L, dissenting).
133 Id. at 577.
134 Id.
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sary or excessively harmful, particularly when judged against our historic
respect for the dignity of the free citizen."' 35 To Stevens, the body cav-
ity search was "clearly the greatest personal indignity.' 36 In these cases,
it is not the conduct or appearance of the prisoner that offends our sense
of universal dignity; it is the state's transgression of respect.
C. RESPECTING AUTONOMY AS A PART OF RESPECTING DIGNITY
The unconditional definition of dignity, as opposed to the dignity
discussed in the abortion context, is not the same as autonomy. Nor, as
in the right to die context, is this third type of dignity somewhat the
opposite of autonomy. Instead, respecting an individual's autonomy is
only a part of what respect for her dignity requires. Recall that the dig-
nity of human beings is, for many thinkers, based on the ability of the
species in general to reason about moral problems and to take moral ac-
tion. Even if rationality is not required of every individual in order to
say that she possesses dignity, the ability to self-govern, to act autono-
mously, is clearly valued. But while respecting the dignity of an individ-
ual requires that we respect her autonomy, it also requires more since
there are other aspects to being human besides rationality. Unconditional
dignity requires a number of responses from us to the individual; only a
subset of those responses stems from our respect for the autonomy of
rational individuals.
135 441 U.S. at 595 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 594; see also National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
680 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (urinalysis testing, whereby the Customs Service "can de-
mand that employees perform 'an excretory function traditionally shielded by great privacy,"'
(quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 626 (1988)) and can
require that the excretion "be turned over to the Government for chemical analysis," is "a type
of search particularly destructive of privacy and offensive to personal dignity"); Skinner, 489
U.S. at 646 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Skinner, Justice Marshall argued that privacy was
violated by the urine testing practice of the Federal Railroad Administration because the Field
Manual directed the supervisors who were collecting the samples to observe the railroad work-
ers as they provided the samples to make sure the samples were not being diluted. Id. To
further his point, Justice Marshall quoted Professor (and later Solicitor General) Charles Fried:
"[I]n our culture the excretory functions are shielded by more or less absolute privacy, so
much so that situations in which this privacy is violated are experienced as extremely distres-
sing, as detracting from one's dignity and self esteem." Id. (quoting Charles Fried, Privacy, 77
YALE L. J. 475, 487 (1968)).
Not all Justices have always used the term dignity to embrace a broad concept of intrinsic
human worth to analyze the rights of criminal defendants or prisoners. See, e.g, Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 684-85 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (distinguishing punishment that is
merely an affront to dignity because it is degrading, and punishment that violates more than
dignity because it is barbaric or inhumane); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 542
(1965) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Miranda rule will return "a killer, a rapist, or
other criminal to the streets," thereby causing "not a gain, but a loss, in human dignity,"
because citizens will resort to "violent self-help with guns, knives and the help of their neigh-
bors similarly inclined.").
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Although casual references to "dignity and autonomy," as if the two
words mean the same thing or point to the same result, may be imprecise,
such references are not overly problematic when dignity is understood in
the unconditional sense. Consequently, it is not surprising when one area
of criminal law looks repeatedly to dignity and autonomy in combination
as the basis for rights. The Supreme Court, and lower courts following
its lead, have used the phrase "dignity and autonomy" in describing the
right of defendants to proceed pro se in a criminal trial.' 37 In this area of
criminal defense rights, what does adding autonomy to the traditional
bulwark of dignity do to qualify or enhance dignity? In contrast with the
criminal cases that limit the state's power to punish or engage in intru-
sive searches, autonomy is clearly involved when consequential choices
must be made. The defendant has the right to exercise control over Iis
defense-to make decisions, to speak for himself, to act indepen-
dently. 138 Thus, it makes sense to speak about autonomy in this context.
At the same time, autonomy does not eclipse dignity. Dignity requires
more than merely letting the defendant make choices, speak, or act inde-
pendently; it requires that as the defendant is doing these things, and
perhaps doing them badly, we respect him as a person.
Although the pro se cases have not adequately unpacked the mean-
ing of "dignity and autonomy" to which they repeatedly refer, and have
not explicitly recognized the distinct meanings of dignity and autonomy,
they have not entirely ignored these issues either. As a result, these cases
are a useful vehicle for examining the relationship between unconditional
dignity and autonomy. The pro se cases, like other cases concerning the
rights of criminal defendants, use the unconditional definition of dignity.
Consequently, even though these self-representation cases reflexively
couple dignity with autonomy, dignity still matters.
D. DiGNrrY AND AUTONOMY IN SELF-REPRESENTATION CASES
In the 1984 case of McKaskle v. Wiggins,139 the Supreme Court
noted that "the right to appear pro se exists to affirm the dignity and
autonomy of the accused and to allow the presentation of what may, at
137 See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-77, 178 (1984); Jones v. Barnes, 463
U.S. 745, 759 (1983) (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting); United States v. McDermott, 64
F.3d 1448, 1454 (10th Cir. 1995); Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024, 1035 (4th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Mills, 895 F.2d 897, 902 (2d Cir. 1990); Oses v. Massachusetts, 775 F. Supp.
443, 456 (D. Mass. 1991), aff'd, 961 F.2d 985 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 954
(1992); People v. Nauton, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 861, 863 (Cal. App. 1994); Snowden v. State, 672
A.2d 1017, 1021 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996); In re Adoption of J.S.P.L., 532 N.W.2d 653, 661
(N.D. 1995).
138 See generally McKaskle, 465 U.S. 168; Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
139 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
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least occasionally, be the accused's best possible defense."'140 The de-
fendant's right to proceed pro se derives from the Sixth Amendment and
was first recognized in Faretta v. California.14 1 While Faretta recog-
nized the defendant's right to self-representation, which "must be
honored out of 'that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of
the law,' "142 it also permitted courts to appoint "standby counsel" to aid
the defendant in technical matters to keep the trial running smoothly. 14 3
McKaskle used a two-part test to decide when a standby counsel goes too
far, interfering with a defendant's pro se right. First, the defendant must
be allowed to preserve actual control over his own case. According to
McKaskle, "[t]his is the core of the Faretta right."'144 Second, the
standby counsel's participation in the trial "should not be allowed to de-
stroy the jury's perception that the defendant is representing himself."'145
The first part of the test established by the Court, the defendant's
right to preserve actual control over his case, most clearly respects the
defendant's autonomy. 146 This concern for the defendant's autonomy is
grounded in the broader notion of dignity that has been recognized for
criminal defendants generally; the imposition of lawyers should not be
one of the punishments or indignities that a person receives for being
accused of a crime. 147
Autonomy also supports the second prong of the McKaskle test,
whether participation by standby counsel has destroyed the jury's per-
ception that the defendant is representing himself. Respect for an indi-
vidual's autonomy may require this test because the defendant should
retain command over decisions that may affect the jury's perception of
him. The defendant therefore should retain the ability to decide whether
he would fare better with the jury through self-representation, relying as
140 465 U.S. 168, 176-77 (1984). Later, the Court wrote: "The defendant's appearance in
the status of one conducting his own defense is important in a criminal trial since the right to
appear pro se exists to affirm the accused's individual dignity and autonomy." Id. at 178.
141 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
142 Id. at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-351 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
143 Id. at 834-36 n.46.
144 465 U.S. at 178.
145 Id. (emphasis added).
146 The Court wrote, "If standby counsel's participation over the defendant's objection
effectively allows counsel to make or substantially interfere with any significant tactical deci-
sions, or to control the questioning of witnesses, or to speak instead of the defendant on any
matter of importance, the Faretta right is eroded." Id.; see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 833-34
(allowing the defendant to choose self-representation is in keeping with framers' belief in "the
inestimable worth of free choice").
147 See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 764 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 ("To force a lawyer on a defendant can only lead him to believe that
the law contrives against him.").
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he might on the theory that "the message conveyed by the defense may
depend as much on the messenger as on the message itself."' 48
But McKaskle's second prong is also clearly about dignity. It pros-
cribes certain behavior on the part of stand-by counsel that is not ade-
quately respectful of the intrinsic human dignity of the defendant.
"Appearing before the jury in the status of one who is defending himself
may be equally important to the pro se defendant."' 49 In addition to the
effect upon the jury, "[f]rom the defendant's own point of view, the right
to appear pro se can lose much of its importance if only the lawyers in
the courtroom know that the right is being exercised."' 50
The appearance that the defendant is acting pro se is not just, in
some rare instances, the defendant's most effective defense (because of
the messenger versus the message theory). According to the McKaskle
Court, it is also tied up in "the dignitary values that the right to self-
representation is intended to promote."' 51 The Court appropriately
draws support for recognition of these dignitary values from earlier cases
holding that courts may not normally force a defendant to appear in court
in shackles or prison garb. 152 The issue is not whether the defendant is
acting with dignity-that would be the conditional form of dignity we
see in the "death with dignity" movement; rather it is the standby coun-
sel's conduct that triggers concern. More specifically, we ask whether
the standby counsel is respecting the defendant's intrinsic dignity. The
essential issue is whether standby counsel is inappropriately disregarding
the defendant's decisions, opinions, preferences, or speech in front of the
jury. The dignity referred to in these cases is an obligation of respect. It
calls for treating others (defendants) as individuals worthy of respect,
148 McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 179.
149 Id.
150 Id. A California appellate court may have summed up the pro se right most memora-
bly when it wrote:
Respect for the dignity and autonomy of the individual is a value universally cele-
brated in free societies and uniformly repressed in totalitarian and authoritarian soci-.
eties. Out of fidelity to that value defendant's choice must be honored even if he
opts foolishly to go to hell in a handbasket. At least, if the worst happens, he can
descend to the netherworld with his head held high. It's called, "Doing It My Way."
People v. Nauton, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 861, 864 (1994).
151 McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 182.
152 See id. at 178 (citing Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976)). In Estelle v. Williams,
the Supreme Court held that a state cannot, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, com-
pel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in prison garb because of the possible
impairment of the presumption of innocence. However, since the defendant did not object to
the court, there was no constitutional violation. Dissenting Justices Brennan and Marshall
objected to the court's acceptance of the waiver of the defendant's right, and offered some
heightened language on the importance of this right: "Identifiable prison garb robs an accused
of the respect and dignity accorded other participants in a trial and constitutionally due the
accused as an element of the presumption of innocence, and surely tends to brand him in the
eyes of the jurors with an unmistakable mark of guilt." Id. at 518.
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worthy of being heard, and not as objects maneuvered around the court-
room for the purposes of others.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court might have looked to the pro se cases for some
answers to the questions posed in Washington v. Glucksberg. Rather
than ignoring the repeated appeals to "dignity and autonomy," and taking
refuge in the past, the Court might have met the call to begin a new
discussion of rights. Glucksberg could have engaged in an analysis of
these two heavily invoked concepts, concepts that have too long been
unquestionably conjoined in the abortion cases and too often misappro-
priated by the lower court right-to-die decisions. Dignity and autonomy
are still only imperfectly paired in the pro se cases, but the connection
those cases share with others that protect the rights of criminal suspects,
defendants, and prisoners, suggests an understanding of dignity that
holds promise for grounding rights.
This unconditional dignity applies to all human beings, and recogni-
tion of it can protect the wicked, the incompetent, the pregnant, the mi-
nor, the weak, the nearly dead, the barely breathing in ways that
respecting autonomy or respecting dignified living and dying cannot.
Even if there is no possibility of autonomous action-for example, an
individual is incapable of autonomous action through physical limitations
of her own or those imposed by outside conditions, such as imprison-
ment-this form of dignity can still be honored. Individuals who lack
the capacity for autonomy still have dignity, but respecting their dignity
does not require us to recognize meaningless rights to autonomy for
them. If the defendant lacks the competency to waive her right to coun-
sel, then we do not allow her to proceed pro se;153 but while we cannot
accord her rights to autonomy, we can still respect her dignity by provid-
ing vigorous representation, allowing her to appear in court without
shackles and in regular clothing, protecting her from self-incrimination,
and ensuring that she understands to the extent possible the processes
against her. Likewise, when an individual is not living up to common
standards of decency, or is considered, in normal parlance, undignified,
she does not lose this inalienable, unconditional human dignity-we still
give her the right to counsel, and permit her to waive that right.
In Glucksberg, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to begin seri-
ous consideration of what dignity and autonomy might each mean when
separated from the other. More specifically, the Court might have em-
barked on a quest to determine what dignity, understood as the intrinsic
153 See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (holding that standard for waiving right to
counsel is same as competency standard for standing trial).
DIGNY AND AUTONOMY
worth of all human beings, requires in terms of constitutional interpreta-
tion. Casual and uncritical references to dignity and autonomy as the
same value limit our thinking about the other human responses that re-
spect for the intrinsic dignity of human beings should prompt, besides
that of respecting their autonomy. Isaiah Berlin, for example, writes
about our universal need for status and recognition, a desire for some-
thing other than liberty or autonomy, a desire "for union, closer under-
standing, integration of interests, a life of common dependence and
common sacrifice."' 154 What would an appreciation for intrinsic human
dignity mean for the role of compassion in law? I have written above
that the death with dignity movement is all-at least in rhetoric-about
dignity (dignified behavior). Yet, as I have written elsewhere, our im-
pulses here are to relieve suffering. 155 The Solicitor General suggested
the same to the Court in Glucksberg.156 Similarly, Justice O'Connor, in
a concurring opinion joined by Justices Ginsberg and Breyer, took pains
to make clear that terminally ill patients are permitted adequate pain
medication even though large doses may have the unintended, but not
unexpected, effect of hastening the patient's death. 157
Respecting the intrinsic human dignity of every person might re-
quire some response to their suffering, their pain, their need. That re-
sponse may or may not come in the form of rights. In the context of
154 Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in IsAIAH BERLIN, FouR ESSAYS OF LIERry
158 (1969). Berlin, contrasting the individual's need for status and recognition with the more
traditional quest for autonomy, writes that:
What I may seek to avoid is simply being ignored, or patronized, or despised, or
being taken too much for granted-in short, not being treated as an individual, hav-
ing my uniqueness insufficiently recognized, being classed as a member of some
featureless amalgam, a statistical unit without identifiable, specifically human fea-
tures and purposes of my own. This is the degradation that I am fighting against-
not equality of legal rights, nor liberty to do as I wish (although I may want these
too), but for a condition in which I feel that I am, because I am taken to be, a
responsible agent, whose will is taken into consideration because I am entitled to it,
even if I am attacked and persecuted for being what I am or choosing as I do.
Id. at 155-56.
155 See Shepherd, supra note 74.
156 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8, Gluck-
sberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (No. 96-110) (arguing that "[a] competent, terminally ill adult has a
constitutionally cognizable liberty interest in avoiding the kind of suffering experienced by the
plaintiffs").
157 See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2303 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (because
such palliative care is not prohibited in either Washington or New York, the Court did not
have to consider "whether suffering patients have a constitutionally cognizable interest in ob-
taining relief from the suffering that they may experience in the last days of their lives."); see
also id. at 2311-12 (Breyer, J., concurring) (agreeing with O'Connor that were the state to
prohibit needed palliative care, a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest might be impli-
cated). See generally Robert A. Burt, 337 NEw ENG. J. MMa. 1234 (1997) (arguing that a court
majority in Glucksberg found "that states must not impose barriers on the availability of pallia-
tive care for terminally ill patients").
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disease and dying, it may not (and I think does not) require that we allow
terminally ill patients to commit suicide with physician assistance. Re-
specting this form of dignity, however, might require that we learn more
about alleviating pain (a subject about which we appear to know notori-
ously little), and that we provide medical care for people regardless of
their ability to pay. In the abortion context, a respect for human dignity
that makes us sensitive to the suffering of others might explain why we
already look to the best interests of immature minors in permitting them
to have abortions without parental consent.
A greater appreciation for the intrinsic dignity of all human beings
might also force us to question more seriously existing incongruities in
the way we handle issues of respect. Why, for example, should we not
be required to treat women walking from their cars to abortion clinics in
the exercise of their autonomous choices with at least the degree of re-
spect we accord criminal defendants exercising their pro se rights in
court-rather than letting them remain subject to repeated "jostling,
grabbing, pushing, and shoving"158 by anti-abortion protesters and leav-
ing them vulnerable to be yelled at and spit upon?15 9 Similarly, why do
we devote the resources we do to ensure that a pro se criminal defendant
is allowed to proceed in court "with his head held high,"160 and yet at the
same time show a too-ready willingness to consider the dependency of
the sick and elderly to be undignified?
While dignity and autonomy were pushed too hard in the recent
right-to-die litigation, and dignity especially has been misunderstood and
mishandled, it is not too late to roll up our sleeves and begin working
anew with these fundamental concepts.
158 Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 117 S. Ct. 855, 866-67 (1997) (holding that floating
buffer zones requiring protestors to stay fifteen feet from people and vehicles entering and
leaving clinics violated the First Amendment).
159 See id. at 860 (describing the past activities of the anti-abortion protestors subject to
the district court injunction at issue in the case). Of course, the quick answer to this question
is, "the First Amendment." But it seems to me that we should, at the least, consider the dignity
of the abortion clinic visitors in our analysis, instead of simply ignoring it.
160 People v. Nauton, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 861, 864 (1994).
